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THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
GLENN ABERNATHY*
The American people are chronic joiners. We join churches,
garden clubs, literary societies, reform leagues, political parties, uni-
ons, social clubs and secret lodges. Those of us who cannot find an
association whose members or purposes appeal to us, or vice versa,
as often as not originate a new association to add to the ever-grow-
ing list of thousands already in existence. If all the Knights of vari-
ous degrees and fealties in the United States were to sally forth to
do battle in a modem religious war, the earlier Crusades by compari-
son would have been minor skirmishes. He is a rare individual who
is not a member of from two to a dozen clubs, societies, orders and
associations. In fact, the multiplicity of organizational affiliations
of the average American, and the corresponding demands on his
time and energy, would lead to the prediction that before many more
decades have passed he will be turning in despair to yet another one
-Associates Anonymous -to effect a cure.
In The Great American Band-Wagon, Charles Merz points to
the American penchant for joining secret societies:
... Into a nation overrun with secret fraternal orders come
each year new secret fraternal orders which somehow live and
prosper. Mere fear of crowding does not faze them. The Elks
are followed by the Moose, the Moose are followed by the Stags,
the Stags are followed by the Buffalos, the Buffalos are followed
by the Deer, the Deer are followed by the Reindeer; it is almost
demonstrably true, and not a mere conceit of the imagination,
that within a decade we shall have the Caribou and then the
Musk-Ox.
Each year the procession lengthens. The apparent fact that
this America of ours is already super-organized with bucks and
birds and knights and seers is only an incentive. On they come:
new orders stumbling over themselves into a world in which
there is ostensibly not the slightest room for them, yet finding
room and settling down and waxing great and adding millions
to their rosters. We have reached a stage, in point of numbers,
when half the adult population of America now owns a fez, a
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scimitar, a secret code, two feet of plume, a cutlass or a pair of
Anatolian- breeches.1
Whether this American propensity for joining is explained by the
herd instinct, or the natural gregariousness of Americans, or the
desire to "belong", or the desire to expand business contacts, or the
urge to participate in a group insurance plan, or a combination of
these, the fact remains that we like to associate ourselves with others
in various organizations. Turning aside from the lighter approach
of Merz, serious probers into this phenomenon have noted that it is
a reflection of some basic features of American political theory and
has offered a positive contribution in the American democratic society.
Arthur Schlesinger states:
At first thought it seems paradoxical that a country famed
for being individualistic should provide the world's greatest
example of joiners .... To Americans individualism has meant,
not the individual's independence of other individuals, but his
and their freedom from governmental restraint. Traditionally,
the people have tended to minimize collective organization as
represented by the state while exercising the largest possible
liberty in forming their own voluntary organizations. This con-
ception of a political authority too weak to interfere with men's
ordinary pursuits actually created the necessity for self-consti-
tuted associations to do things beyond the capacity of a single
person, and by reverse effect the success of such ende avors
proved a continuing argument against the growth of stronger
government.2
Whether or not freedom of association is encompassed by freedom
of assembly, it is at least a right cognate to the latter. And its im-
portance in a democratic society cannot be overestimated. Writing
in the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville stated:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of act-
ing for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those
of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. The
right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalien-
1. Charles Merz, THz GErT AmERICAN BAND-WAGON, pp. 27-28 (New
York, 1928).
2. Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Biography of a Nation of Joiners," 50 AM. HIST.
REV. 1 (1944).
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able its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator
can attack it without impairing the foundations of society.3
The United States Supreme Court has not yet accorded the right
of association the general protection of the First Amendment rights.
But in a concurring opinion in 1952 on the validity of the State of
Oklahoma's version of the loyalty oath, Justice Frankfurter stated:
• . . [T]o require such an oath, on pain of a teacher's loss
of his position in case of refusal to take the oath, penalizes a
teacher for exercising a right of association peculiarly charac-
teristic of our people . . . Such joining is an exercise of the
rights of free speech and free inquiry. By limiting the power
of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom
of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects all persons, no matter what their calling.4
As to the origins of the associative urge in America, Arthur
Schlesinger states:
• . . [T]he colonial era saw the emergince of what was to be-
come a dominant American trait. Prompted originally by a
passion for liberty of worship, and for a long time going no
further, the associative impulse began to invade more mundane
undertakings as the break with England approached. Though
it achieved decisive results only in the realm of public affairs,
the foundations were laid for future progress in other respects
as well. National independence hastened these tendencies. The
philosophy of natural rights underlying the Revolution exalted
the individual's capacity to act for himself; the military struggle
taught men from different sections valuable lessons in practical
co-operation; the mounting sense of national consciousness sug-
gested new vistas of achievement; and Britain was powerless
to interpose a restraining hand. A little later, after a decade
of political instability, the adoption of the Constitution stimu-
lated still further applications of the collective principle. 5
In the economic sector more voluntary associations arose. This
was particularly evident in the period immediately following the rati-
fication of the Constitution, when canals, bridges, and roads were
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, D9socnAcy IN AmICA, Vol. I, p. 196 (New
York, 1945).
4. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 195 (1952).
5. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 5.
[Vol. 6
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built by private enterprise, and the corporate device grew out of the
earlier looser associations.
In spite of the perturbation of Madison over the evils of faction,
the separation of powers in the Constitution was itself a contribut-
ing factor to the growth of the largest factions in the United States
-political parties. The need for a harmonizing element to bridge
the gap between legislative and executive branches was at least partly
a factor in the rise of political parties.
Literary societies and social clubs grew as the frontier advanced
westward, permitting more leisurely bccupations in the east. In
the 1820's the associative urge of religious groups focussed on hu-
manitarian societies for the abolition of slavery or war or strong
drink, or the reform of women of doubtful virtue.
After the Civil War, the rise of large cities and the improvements
in communication lent added impetus to the growth of associations,
and from then to the present time the number and purposes of such
associations have steadily increased. The farmers joined together
to battle the business men. Laborers united to employ concerted pres-
sure for better wages and working conditions. Business men merged
to form mammoth trusts and combines. Professional men and scholars
formed their associations. And in the avocational field the secret
fraternal societies came into their own, with more than five million
members in over 70,000 local lodges by the end of the 19th century.
Of what value are these myriad associations in a democratic so-
ciety? Is their usefulness merely in a harmless outlet for unspent
energy, or is there a more vital purpose served? If the former, then
legal restrictions on their activities might result in individual in-
convenience or annoyance, but would not necessarily be occasion for
alarm. If the various associations represent a positive force for mak-
ing a democratic society function properly, however, then such re-
strictions should be examined closely in order to determine whether
this typical American institution itself is in danger of being so
fettered as to fail in its contribution.
In every association there is, in varying degrees, some inquiry,
some discussion, and some interchange of ideas and opinions. Unless
the purposes of the association are patently illegal or improper, par-
ticipation in these activities is of obvious value in a democracy. It
might be difficult to ascertain the positive contribution in this con-
text of discussions on the care and growth of roses by a group of
amateur horticulturists. But no matter what the subject of discus-
sion, there is apt to be gleaned a residue of training and experience
1953]
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in the give and take of ideas and opinions which can be translated
usefully into the arena of conflict between views on the larger prob-
lems of humanity. Techniques acquired in the examination of even
the most mundane problems might very well prove valuable in reach-
ing conclusions on the more serious questions of life. In addition
there is the important training in organization, management, and
group action in accordance with the will of the majority.
The criticism is sometimes made that in the American practice
of joining associations there results the submersion of individuality
into group ideas, group thinking and group personality. But union
does not necessarily mean uniformity. It is indeed the supreme value
of associational behavior that it can lead ultimately to the most pro-
ductive and worthwhile type of individualism -that fulfillment of
individual personality and capacity which includes recognition of
individual responsibility within the social environment.
The novice joiner is quite apt to follow the pattern of thought
and action set by the group "leader" in his eagerness to reach full
acceptance into the group. Nowhere is this habit more in evidence
than in the various adolescent clubs, fraternities and sororities. High
school club members feel that they must adopt the same cliches, the
same dress, the same prejudices and the same enthusiasms as the
other members-the style being set by the club leader or leaders.
These, however, are the associations of novices. With age, these
super-conformists realize that membership in mimicry is unsatis-
factory. The pendulum is then apt to swing to the opposite extreme,
with the next stage of associational behavior being one of chronic
dissent. The urge for recognition as an individualist is expressed
in criticism and opposition to the group program. With maturity
comes the realization that perennial opposition is not the most fruit-
ful role of the individual in an association; nor is it the role most
likely to win for its possessor the respect of his associates. The
octogenarian who stated that he had seen many changes in his life-
time and had been " 'agin' every one of them" might be considered
an individualist by some, but his philosophy does not offer any posi-
tive force for advancing civilization or human relationships. It is
the most important contribution of activity within lawful associations
that it can bring to the individual the realization that he only attains
real individualism in societal living when he can bring to bear his
own unique physical and mental equipment as a positive force for
the solution of the group problems. And as the novice joiner be-
comes educated in the associational process within the less important
[Vol. 6
5
Abernathy: The Right of Association
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
19531 RIGHT Ov ASSOCIATION
groups, he is free to move into other associations of loftier aims
and more complex problems.
But the exchange of ideas and this development of the "societal
individualist" are not the only values of associations in a democracy.
Experience in various associations is virtually a guarantee of respect
for the majority will. As already pointed out, it does not lead
necessarily to complete acceptance of the majority will, but it does
lead usually to a sufficient respect for that will to enable the group
to act in concert once that will is determined. This acquiescence
in the majority will, based in large part on experience in associa-
tions of various types, is an important explanation for the fact that
Americans can close ranks and function as a strongly united nation
after an election which is preceded by almost violent contests be-
tween the two major political parties.
De Tocqueville stated:
• . . [T]hey cannot belong to these associations for any length
of time without finding out how order is maintained amongst a
large number of men, and by what contrivance they are made to
advance, harmoniously and methodically, to the same object.
Thus they learn to surrender their own will to that of all the
rest, and to make their own exertions subordinate to the common
impulse- things which it is not less necessary to know in civil
than in political associations. Political associations may there-
fore be considered as large free schools, where all the members
of the community go to learn the general theory of association.6
Democratic acquiescence in the majority will is a strong surety
for the proper performance in world organizations of nations with
that tradition. It might very well be that American efforts to demo-
cratize totalitarian countries could in the long run profitably center
on the attempt to direct individuals in those countries into the habit
of more frequent and diverse associational experiences.7
The educational factor in the institution of association is not its
only usefulness. The existence of certain types of associations, par-
ticularly those of the various professional groups, serves to relieve
the citizenry of the necessity of imposing governmental regulations
and restrictions to the degree that would be required without these
associations. In all probability the medical practitioners in the United
6. Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMMICA, Vol. II, p. 107 (Reeve
trans., London, 1889).
7. For a brief discussion of voluntary associations in a dictatorship, see J. A.
Corry, ELEMENTS ov DMocRATic GOVmRMNT, pp. 284-287 (New York, 1951).
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States are much more concerned with maintaining a proper status
and standing in the American Medical Association than they are with
legislation regulating their practice. This is probably true because
the great bulk of the legislation regulating medical practices has
come into being at the request of doctors and the medical asso-
ciations.8 This is not always the case, as witness the Massachusetts
prohibition against the teaching or advocacy of birth control methods
by doctors in that state, but in general this appears to be true. The
examinations themselves for the licensing of doctors are drawn up
and administered by boards composed of doctors and acting under
the general supervision of medical associations.9 Thus in great meas-
ure the regulation of the practice of medicine is self-imposed regula-
tion springing from within the members of the profession itself.
If this system of regulation works in practice, and in spite of certain
defects it appears to operate to the benefit of Americans generally,
then it obviously relieves the people of the responsibility of deter-
mining in each minute facet of medical practice what regulations
should be imposed. And in addition its operation reduces the number
of enforcement personnel necessary for the State to administer the
regulations. The doctors, in association, take care of their own
dirty linen without the necessity for a great deal of outside control.
These. internal and extra-legal sanctions have ramifications which
extend far beyond the particular professional activities of the asso-
ciation involved. Obviously the fear of loss of standing in the
American Medical Association will operate to keep the individual
doctor from violating the rules and ethics set out by that Associa-
tion. But in addition, one of the important incentives for labor
and research in the doctor's chosen field is the recognition and respect
of other members of his group. The slow development of the status
of doctors from the position of barber-bleeder to their present posi-
tion of prestige in the community"0 has been due not only to the
various medical associations' insistence on technical competence, but
to their emphasis on reasonable conformity to local conceptions of
community morality in all areas of daily living. And no matter
whether the particular association be tightly organized, as are the
8. Of the New Jersey Medical Society; Dayton McKean says, "It can usu-
ally block such bills as it does not like and it can secure the passage of the
measures it approves." PRSSURES ON THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW ITERSEY, p. 71
(New York, 1938).
9. On the control over entrance into various professions by the professions
themselves, see Francis P. DeLancey, THa LICENSING OV PROFFSSIONS IN WZST
VIRGINIA (Chicago, 1938).
10. See Howard W. Haggard, DEVI.S, DRUGS, AND DoCTOas (Garden City,
1929), for an account of the development of the status of obstetrics.
[Vol. 6
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medical and bar associations, with strong sanctions at their disposal,
or very informally organized with a mundane purpose and few
sanctions to employ against obstreperous members, the fear of the
scorn or displeasure of the others in the association is a strong
deterrent to violation of the canons of good conduct, whether laid in
custom only or in legislation. The lawyer does not ordinarily en-
gage in barratry because of the danger of disbarment and loss of the
privilege of practicing his chosen profession. But neither does he
usually engage in other practices violative of community morality,
because his opportunities for promotion and advancement in the
profession depend in great part on the esteem and respect of his
fellow association members. Without the association there would
still be the deterring effect of community displeasure, of course, but
the force of this effect would be less strong than that of his profes-
sional association. Nor is the associational sanction absent when
the particular group is not a professional group. The effect is still
potent even though the group be only a Tuesday Reading Club or
a Country Club association. Members guard their reputation and
that of their families in order to retain the approbation of their fel-
low members. And in fact the effect extends even outside the
membership to those persons who wish to obtain invitations to mem-
bership. The net result, then, is that the operation of many associa-
tions serves to eliminate the necessity for much government regula-
tion which otherwise might be required. The association also serves
as an informal law enforcing institution of probably greater potency
than many of the formal enforcement agencies. Associations are
in a large sense sub-governmental institutions."
These points are given great emphasis by some of the philosophical
anarchists. They are at the core of Kropotkin's argument that for-
mal government is unnecessary. He pointed out that without govern-
ment, every normal individual will become a member of some asso-
ciation. And where some individuals are impelled to antisocial acts,
fear of expulsion from the various fellowships or associations will
supply the necessary corrective.12
In addition to the educational and sub-governmental values, there
is a third. Associations operate as a check on the tyranny of the
majority and at the same time the possible despotism of a few.
Both are inherent dangers in a democracy. De Tocqueville states:
11. See Charles E. Merriam, PUBLIC AND P~uvATz GOVZRx=NIJT (New
Haven, 1944).
12. Francis W. Coker, RECENT POLITICAT. THOUGHT, p. 212 (New York,
1934). See also A. P. Kropotkin, MUTUAL AID, c. 8 (New York, 1919).
1953]
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. . . At the present time the liberty of association has become
a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority. In
the United States, as soon as a party has become dominant, all
public authority passes into its hands; its private supporters
occupy all the offices and have all the force of the administration
at their disposal. As the most distinguished members of the op-
posite party cannot surmount the barrier that excludes them
from power, they must establish themselves outside of it and
oppose the whole moral authority of the minority to the physical
power that domineers over it. Thus a dangerous expedient is
used to obviate a still more formidable danger.
The omnipotence of the majority appears to me to be so full
of peril to the American republics that the dangerous means used
to bridle it seem to be more advantageous than prejudicial ....
There are no countries in which associations are more needed to
prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a
prince than those which are democratically constituted. In
aristocratic nations the body of the nobles and the wealthy are
in themselves natural associations which check the abuses of
power. In countries where such associations do not exist, if
private individuals cannot create an artificial and temporary sub-
stitute for them I can see no permanent protection against the
most galling tyranny; and a great people may be oppressed with
impunity by a small faction or by a single individual.' 3
De Tocqueville was referring primarily to political associations in
his discussions. However, so many present-day associations operate
as pressure groups, whether continuously or intermittently, that the
right of protection against majority tyranny or even factional tyranny
must include more than just political associations as such. While
we do not have a multi-party system in the United States, it might
be said that within the two major parties there is a multi-associational
system. And a victory by either party to some degree represents
not simply the single party victory which appears on the surface,
but in a sense a coalition victory for the associations combining to
effect majority support. Since the nominal victor can only retain
power by espousing what might be called the lowest common de-
nominator of legislative policy acceptable to the components of the
victorious combination, the danger of tyrannous behavior is minimal.
The people acting through associations are much more alert to the
possibilities of injurious legislation and executive action than are
13. Alexis de Tocqueville, D MOCRACY iN AmmucA, Vol. I, pp. 194-5.
[Vol. 6
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individuals acting as individuals. In addition, the concerted pro-
tests of associations have greater effect on legislative decisions than
do scattered complaints of individuals. 14
There is also some apparent stimulus connected with the act of
association which almost immediately suggests the possibility of
reaching desired goals through political action. This appears to be
true even when the goal is not necessarily best attained by shifting
the pattern of governmental action. Whether any particular program
of action is wise or unwise, however, the value to a democracy is that
of any well operated system of pressure groups. First, concerted
action or pressure on governmental agencies has a far greater chance
of success than does the sporadic pressure of numerous individuals
acting separately. If influencing government is the chosen method
of action, then associations and association pressure give the individu-
al an opportunity to exert effective influence which he would not
otherwise have. On this point the preamble to the constitution of
the United States Brewers' Association states:
Cooperation is necessary. Owners of breweries, separately,
are unable to exercise a proper influence in the legislative and
public administration. It appears especially necessary for the
brewing trade that its interests be vigorously and energetically
prosecuted before the legislative and executive departments, as
this branch of business is of considerable political and financial
importance, exerting a direct as well as an indirect influence on
political and social relations. 15
A single fisherman would have little prospect of getting a legisla-
tive body to enact legislation controlling stream pollution. But when
all the local chapters of the Isaac Walton League put pressure on
the state and national legislatures, then action on this point is ob-
tained. As for the "pressure potential" in this country, a recent
writer points out that there are some 8,000 trade associations, 30,-
14. See, for example, the study of the activity of one of the most effective
pressure groups in this century: Peter H. Odegard, PRESSURE POLITICS:
THE STORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE (New York, 1928). For
general discussions see: V. 0. Key, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRES-
SURE GROUPS, c. VI (3d ed., New York, 1952); Howard Penniman, edi-
tor SALT'S AMERICAN PARTIES AND ELECTIONS, c. VI (Sth ed.,
New York, 1952) ; Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, Am ICAN POLITrCS,
c. XXII, (2d ed., New York, 1947). For a study of the unsuccessful opposi-
tion to the Rent Control Act of 1949, see Stephen K. Bailey and Howard S.
Samuel, CoNmREss AT WoRK, c. X (New York, 1952).
15. Quoted by V. 0. Key, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE
GROUPS, p. 177 (2d ed., New York, 1948).
1953]
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500 associations concerned with agriculture, over 50,000 women's
associations, and about 500 professional associations.' 6
Although the associative device is valuable as a means of exert-
ing influence on legislatures and administrative bodies, it is no less
valuable as a source of information for those groups to enable them
to act intelligently as policy makers. V. 0. Key states that:
Pressure groups fill a gap in our formal political system by
performing a function of representation beyond the capacities of
representatives chosen by the voters in geographical districts.
If it is the duty of government in a democracy to reflect the
wishes of the people, means have to be found to ascertain those
wishes . . . Special interests came to be organized so that, in
part, the cheese makers, the laborers, the drys, -or others of like
views and interests might have representatives who could state
their attitudes authoritatively before the government and the
public.
17
When the legislators have the information on the views of their
constituents, then they can act to reconcile and compromise the con-
flicting interests intelligently. In the Federalist Madison stated:
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile in-
terest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up
of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different
classes, actuated by different sentiments and views., The regula-
tion of these various and interfering interests forms the prin-
cipal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.'
8
While Madison's emphasis was on economic classes or factions,
it would not seem amiss to include other special interest groups in
the context of his statement. V. 0. Key takes this additional step
and says:
The principal driving forces in politics are class interests and
group interests; they make themselves felt regardless of the
kind of government or social organization that exists. It is a
16. Dayton D. McKean, PARTrY AND PRaSURE PoraTIcs, p. 430 (Boston,
1949).
17. V. 0. Key, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS,
p. 178 (2d ed., New York, 1948). See also Hugh A. Bone, AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, pp. 242-244 (New York, 1949).
18. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, p. 56 (Modern Library ed., New York,
1941).
[Vol. 6
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function of government to attempt to reconcile the interests of
these groups, to devise policies that provide an accommodation
among conflicting drives, to maintain social unity despite the
inevitable diversity of interest of social groups and classes. Free-
dom of association and freedom of expression of interest facili-
tate the resolution of conflict through open discussion of divisive
issues. If a citizen is dissatisfied, he is free to organize his own
society to advance his own cause. Moreover, the promotion
of the public good cannot be accomplished apart from class or
special interest. The public good is, after all, a relative matter.
It rarely consists in yielding completely to the demands of one
class or group in society. It more often consists in the elabora-
tion of compromise between conflicting groups, in the yielding
to one class at one time and to another at another, and some-
times in the mobilization of the support of the great unorganized
general public to batter down the demands of class interest.
1 9
If the main task of government, or even one of the main tasks,
is to reconcile or regulate the various interests in a democratic society,
then certainly the legislative bodies can well use information gleaned
from the positions taken by these various interests. And the asso-
ciations which operate as pressure groups, even if only occasionally,
perform a real service in advising legislators. Congressman Kefauver
declared in 1947 that Congress, even after its reformation under
the Reorganization Act,
20 could not function without the lobbyists.
2 '
And the lobbyists' existence depends upon the existence of asso-
ciations.
There is a further step which the interest or pressure group which
gains sufficient numerical and financial support might take, and this
is formation into a political party. While few of the total number
of interest groups in this country have taken this further step, there
have been some.22 The Prohibition Party is a notable example. And
agrarian, Catholic, and labor parties have been formed in some demo-
cratic societies. Certainly association within political parties is a
19. V. 0. Key, op. cit., p. 197.
20. 60 Stat, at L. 812.
21. Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AM 5RCAN
PoLITIcs, p. 466 (New York, 1951).
22. For discussions of the minor parties see: V. 0. Key, op. cit., c. X;
Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, AMERICAN POLITICS, pp. 799-803
(2d ed., New York, 1947); Howard R. Penniman, SAIT'S AMERICAN
PARTIES AND ELECTIONS, c. XII (5th ed., New York, 1952).
12
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major aspect of democratic society.23 The party is our most impor-
tant association, and the right to form a party or belong to one is
not left to the vagaries of group decision. It is a matter of law.2 4
Joseph Starr states that the usual judicial interpretation is that
the right to form political parties is part of the right to vote, and
quotes the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
The right of suffrage includes the right of voters to separate
into groups according to their political beliefs respecting govern-
mental policies, and the right of every group to organize and
have all the machinery in that regard not reasonably prohibited
by law for making the organization effective as regards declar-
ing the policy of its members, and vitalizing such policies by
electing officers in harmony therewith to legislate and execute
law to that end.25
It can also be stated with considerable justification that the right
to organize political parties is simply an inherent right of a free
people. If parties are a natural result of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly as applied to operations of government, then
the right to form parties must be protected to safeguard the basic
rights of the people. On whatever its basis rests, however, the courts
have held that the legislature does not have the power to deny to
the people the right generally to organize political parties.2 6
Since one of the main purposes of formation into political parties
is the capture of public office, the question arises as to how parties
get their candidates on the ballot. In this aspect of party associa-
tion there are more definite legal provisions.
In most of the states the direct primary is the method used for
nomination of candidates. The two major parties and others which
have a strong following have no difficulty obtaining recognition in
the primaries. Parties are defined by statute in all but six of the
states in terms of numerical strength. The requirements are expressed
in terms of the per cent which the party obtained of the total vote for
23. See Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, op. cit., pp. 788-789; V. 0.
Key, op. cit., c. VIII; Howard R. Penniman, op. cit., cc. IX-X; E. E. Schatt-
schneider, PARTY GOVERNMENT, c. I (New York, 1942); Hugh A. Bone,
AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, c. XI (New York,
1949).
24. See Joseph R. Starr, "The Legal Status of American Political Parties,"
34 AmM. POL. SCr. REv. 439, 685 (June and August, 1940).
25. Ibid., at 444.
26. Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners, 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac. 1115
(1900) ; Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 91 N. W. 1124 (1902) ; Ex parte
Wilson, 7 Okla. Crim. Rep. 610, 125 Pac. 739 (1912); Sarlls v. State ex
rel. Trimble, 210 Ind. 88, 166 N. E. 270 (1929).
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some officer voted for throughout the state, such as governor. Starr
states: "The minimum size for a political party to obtain recogni-
tion under the primary act is usually expressed in a percentage of
the total vote cast in the last general election, and these percentages
now range from one per cent to one quarter of the total vote. In
New York and Texas, the requirement is expressed instead in round
numbers - 50,000 and 100,000, respectively."2 7
This requirement, however, gives no room for participation by
new parties. A few states make provision for this exigency, cus-
tomarily by presentation of a petition signed by a specified number
of qualified voters.
Arizona permits a group to qualify by filing a petition signed
by a number of voters equal to at least two per cent of the
votes cast for governor in the last election, provided signa-
tures are obtained in at least five counties. California permits
a political party to participate in the direct primary whenever
its enrolled registrants equal one per cent of the entire vote
cast in the last election, or if a petition is signed by voters to
the number of at least ten per cent of the entire vote in the last
election is filed. Nebraska permits a new political party, or-
ganized in a mass convention, to have a separate ballot in the
ensuing primary election .... In Ohio, the petition requirement
is fifteen per cent, in South Dakota three per cent, and in Wis-
consin one-sixth of the voters in at least ten counties.2 8
South Carolina permits parties which offered candidates for presi-
dential and vice-presidential electors in the previous election to be
certified as political parties by the Secretary of State, and new par-
ties may obtain such certification by filing with the Secretary a
petition signed by ten thousand or more registered electors residing
in the state.
2 9
The process of selection of candidates then goes to the final stage
in the general election. And provision for participation in the pri-
mary includes participation in the general election. Thus parties
with sufficient strength are assured a place in the primary and in the
general election ballot. The smaller ones are left without ability to
participate in the primary, and their candidates can appear on the
general election ballot only through write-ins.
There is some justification for keeping the very small parties off
27. Joseph R. Starr, op. cit., at 453.
28. Ibid., at 454.
29. South Carolina ACTS, 1950, No. 858, § 6-A.
1953]
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1953], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol6/iss1/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
the ballot. Ballots in many states are sufficiently confusing with
only two parties represented, without further adding to the confu-
sion. And since the expense of printing is borne by the state, it
is justifiable for the state to set reasonable minimums which new
parties must meet in order to prevent the onerous expenditure oc-
casioned by listing every party slate merely on request of a handful
of publicity seekers.
As our most important associations, political parties must be as
free as possible from official control. The danger to be avoided is
the making of political parties into agencies of the state, as has been
done in the totalitarian countries. Certainly absolute freedom is not
to be desired, but the opportunity should be broad for small as well
as large political organizations to vie for governmental control within
rules safeguarding honest and democratic procedures. The question
of what has been done and what should be done about participation
of Communists and criminal syndicalists raises special problems, and
is discussed below.
The conclusion is, then, that associations offer a real contribution
in a democratic society. Whether the particular association is purely
local with the most mundane purpose or is a vast political party, so
long as its activities are legal it can be of positive benefit to our society.
This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that associations are
properly to be left completely unregulated. The right to associate is
important, but it cannot be an absolute right when its exercise will
endanger the lives, property or liberty of others. Certainly such
associations as Murder, Incorporated, which during the late 1940's
could be employed, for a fee, to eliminate one's enemies,8 0 cannot be
justified as operating under any constitutional guarantee. The ques-
tions, are, however, how far should the legislature go in restricting
the right of association, and which associations can properly be for-
bidden altogether?
Association With Criminals
In McQuillin's Law of Municipal Corporations, it is stated that,
"The question of unconstitutional restriction of liberty of association
has arisen, insofar as ordinances are concerned, most frequently in
connection with ordinances prohibiting and penalizing association
with persons of ill repute."'3 1 The reported cases indicate that the
30. For a study of this syndicate see Burton B. Turkus and Sid Feder, MUR-
DER, INC. (New York, 1951).
31. Eugene McQuillin, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
Vol. 5, pp. 561-562 (3rd ed., by Ray Smith, Chicago, 1949).
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courts uniformly hold ordinances invalid which penalize mere asso-
ciation without unlawful acts.
A St. Louis ordinance prohibited the knowing, willing, and unlaw-
ful association with persons having the reputation of being thieves,
burglars, pickpockets, pigeon droppers, and gamblers, for the pur-
pose of conspiring to aid them in gambling, gaming, and pigeon drop-
ping, at various gambling houses. In St. Louis v. Roche,32 in 1895,
Roche was tried and convicted for violation of the ordinance. On
appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court the conviction was reversed.
The opinion stated:
The offense consists, not in aiding or abetting in the commis-
sion of some specific unlawful act, or in conspiring to do so,
but in knowingly and unlawfully associating with certain per-
sons having the reputation of being thieves and burglars . . .
with the design and intent of conspiring .... Our constitution
and laws guarantee to every citizen the right to go where and
when he pleases, exacting from him only that he conduct him-
self in a decent and orderly manner, that he disturb no one,
and that he interfere with the rights of no other citizen ....
However humble may be the citizen arrested under an ordi-
nance prohibiting intercourse with such former criminal, his
right to select his own company, so long as no actual breach of
law occurs, . . . is sacred, and as much under the protection of
the state, as though he moved in the more elevated spheres of so-
ciety 88
In the Roche case the Court reversed the conviction, but did not
hold the ordinance unconstitutional except as applied in that case.
In the following year, in Ex parte Smith 34 the Court held the ordi-
nance invalid on its face. Judge Sherwood, speaking for the Court,
stated:
Obviously there is no difference in point of legal principle be-
tween a legislative or municipal act which forbids certain asso-
ciations, and one which commands certain associations. We
deny the power of any legislative body in this country to choose
for our citizens whom their associates shall be.35
While the holding appears to be proper, the reasoning does not
seem to be very persuasive. The constitutionality of legislative pro-
32. 128 Mo. 541, 31 S. W. 915 (1895).
33. 31 S. W. 915, 917 (1895).
34. 135 Mo. 223, 36 S. W. 628, 33 L.R.A. 606 (1896).
35. 36 S. W. 628, 629 (1896).
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hibitions does not hinge on whether the legislature could attempt the
converse and command the same action in another place or in con-
junction with other persons. The constitutionality of a municipal
ordinance prohibiting residences in business zones does not hinge on
the converse authority to command that certain persons build their
homes on certain specific lots. Merely to have shown that the or-
dinance is an unreasonable restraint on personal liberty should have
been sufficient.
A similar type of ordinance was contested in Hechinger v. Mays-
VillC,36 although the outcasts were prostitutes in this instance. The
Maysville, Kentucky, ordinance declared it unlawful for any person
other than the husband, father, brother or male relative, to associate
with any female known as a common prostitute, either by day or by
night, upon any of the streets or alleys of the city. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals held the ordinance invalid because a mother or
sister should be allowed the same privilege as allowed to the father
or brother, and any person should be allowed to converse with such
prostitute long enough to transact any necessary and legitimate busi-
ness.
Apparently the only case of this nature to reach the United States
Supreme Court was Lanzetta v. New Jersey,s 7 decided in 1939. Lan-
zetta was convicted of violating the New Jersey Gangster Act of
1934, which provided:
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to
be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who
has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly per-
son, or who has been convicted of any crime in this or in any
other State, is declared to be a gangster ....
The penalty for conviction as a "gangster" under this law was a
fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding twenty
years, or both. The Court held the law violative of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of vagueness in what
it purported to denounce. Justice Butler, speaking for the Court,
said:
The phrase "consisting of two or more persons" is all that
purports to define "gang". The meanings of that word indi-
cated in dictionaries and in historical and sociological writings
36. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 486, 57 S. W. 619 (1900). For other cases holding simi-
larly on this type of ordinance, see: Lancaster v. Reed, 207 S. W. 868 (Mo.
App. 1919); Coker v. Ft. Smith, 162 Ark. 567, 258 S. W. 388 (1924).
37. 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
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are numerous and varied. Nor is the meaning derivable from
the common law, for neither in that field nor anywhere in the
language of the law is there definition of the word. Our atten-
tion has not been called to, and we are unable to find, any other
statute attempting to make it criminal to be a member of a
"gang"....
The lack of certainty of the challenged provision is not limited
to the word "gang" or to its dependent "gangster".. . . The en-
actment employs the expression, "known to be a member." It
is ambiguous. There immediately arises the doubt whether ac-
tual or putative association is meant. If actual membership is
required, that status must be established as a fact, and the word
"known" would be without significance. If reputed member-
ship is enough, there is uncertainty whether that reputation
must be general or extend only to some persons. And the
statute fails to indicate what constitutes membership or how one
may join a "gang". 8
Thus while association which amounts to conspiracy to commit a
crime may be prohibited, mere association with criminals or unsavory
characters may not.
Labor Unions
A comprehensive treatment of the development of labor law in
the United States would not only be out of place here, but would be
altogether too unwieldy for inclusion.39 This discussion, then, is
confined to the development of the right of laborers to associate to-
gether for certain purposes as laborers, without particular emphasis
on means employed by such associations to gain their ends.
One writer states that:
The common law, while leaving employers unrestrained in
their use of economic force, placed severe limitations on unions.
38. 306 U. S. 451, 453-4, 458 (1939).
39. For more comprehensive treatments see: Robert E. Matthews (editor),
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW (Boston, 1953, advance printing);
Charles 0. Gregory, LABOR AND THE LAW (New York, 1949); Edward
Bennan, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (New York, 1931); Felix
Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (New York,
1930). For general histories of labor unions in the United States see: John
R. Commons and associates, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERI-
CAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, 10 vols. (Cleveland, 1910); Seliq Perlman
and Philip Taft, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES,
1896-1932, LABOR MOVEMENTS (New York, 1935); Harold W. Metz,
LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Washington,
1945); Herbert Harris, AMERICAN LABOR (New Haven, 1938); Foster
R. Dulles, LABOR IN AMERICA (New York, 1949).
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Originally the courts considered unions illegal combinations ob-
structing the free play of economic forces in the labor market.
Any concerted action by workers to better their conditions was
unlawful ....
Although unions came to be recognized as legal combinations,
they were not permitted the same freedom as employers to use
their economic strength. The courts rigidly circumscribed their
activities, practically frustrating any effective action. Only grad-
ually was the area of freedom extended, as the judicial attitude
toward unions changed. The legal limitations on unions, there-
fore, consist primarily of judge-made rules. Legislation has
sought to alleviate the harshness of those limitations. This is
in direct contrast to the limitations on employers which are al-
most solely legislative in origin.40
The earliest legal theory applied restrictively to labor unions was
based on the common law concept of criminal conspiracy. Under
this doctrine the lawful activities of an individual would be held un-
lawful when done in concert with other individuals. If this doctrine
is carried to the extreme, as it was in some cases, it is clear that all
action of the unions relative to their employment would be illegal.
The first American case on this point, commonly described as the
"First American Labor Case,'"41 was the Philadelphia Cordwainers'
Care (Commonwealth v. Pulls),42 tried in the Mayor's Court in
1806. The indictment was for conspiracy of several journeymen
cordwainers in the shoe industry. It charged them with combining
together in a society to refuse to work except at certain rates, to
threaten and menace other cordwainers who worked at rates lower
than those set, and to refuse to work for any employer who hired
any cordwainer who did not abide by the rules of the society.
In his charge to the jury, Recorder Levy answered the contention
that the spirit of the revolution and the principles of the common law
were opposite in the case. He stated that the activity of the combina-
tion "is pregnant with public mischief and private injury . . . tends
to demoralize the workmen . . . destroy the trade of the city, and
leaves the pockets of the whole community to the discretion of the
concerned. If these evils were unprovided for by the law now exist-
40. Robert E. Matthews editor, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW,
Vol. II, p. 635 (Boston, 1953, advance printing).
41. See Nelles, "The First American Labor Case," 41 YAL L. J. 165 (1931).
42. Ibid., p. 637, quoting from 3 Commons and Gilmore, A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59-248
(1910).
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ing, it would be necessary that laws should be made to restrain them."'43
He stated further that, "A combination of workmen to raise their
wages may be considered in a two fold point of view: one is to bene-
fit themselves .... The other is to injure those who do not join their
society. The rule of law condemns both." 4  After this' virtual di-
rected verdict of guilty, the jury followed the suggestion and found
the defendants guilty of a combination to raise their wages. A num-
ber of other cases followed the Cordwainers' Case involving criminal
prosecutions for organizing to compel higher wages.43
Foster Dulles states that "These conspiracy cases aroused wide-
spread resentment among the workingmen. Were all other combina-
tions, among merchants, among politicians, among sportsmen, among
'ladies and gentlemen for balls, parties, and banquets' to be permitted,
they asked, and only the poor laborers combining against starvation
to be indicted?"46 He states further:
The issue was injected into local policies [sic]. Federalists
and Jeffersonian Republicans were at the time engaged in a bitter
controversy over the general use of English common law in the
United States, and the latter considered the application of what
they termed its undemocratic principles to labor unions a chal-
lenge to the whole cause of liberty. The right of association
could not be divorced from other fundamental rights, the Re-
publicans declared, and they zealously took up the working-
men's cause ....
The controversy was to continue for many years to come but
the decisions against the workingmen stood. They did not stop
the further organization of labor societies nor wholly prevent
the use of strikes and boycotts. When the employers resorted
to the courts, however, the workingmen were hard pressed to
defend themselves against conspiracy charges. 47
The year 1842 marked a landmark decision with respect to criminal
prosecutions against labor associations, Commonwealth v. Hunt .48
In that case the Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of the Boston Journeymen Bootmakers who were charged with caus-
43. Ibid., p. 638.
44. Ibid., p. 639.
45. See People v. Melvin, 2 Wheller Cr. Cas. 262 (1810); Pittsburg
Cordwainers' Case (1815), 4 Commons and Gilmore, A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 15 (1910); People
v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 10 (New York, 1835).
46. Foster R. Dulles, LABOR IN AMERICA, p. 30 (New York, 1949).
47. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
48. 4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842).
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ing the discharge of a member who accepted less than the established
wage rate. In holding the indictment insufficient, Chief Justice Shaw
stated :
The manifest intent of the association is, to induce all those
engaged in the same occupation to become members of it. Such
a purpose is not unlawful. It would give them a power which
might be exerted for useful and honorable purposes, or for
dangerous and pernicious ones. If the latter were the real and
actual object, and susceptible of proof, it should have been spe-
cially charged . . But in order to charge all those, who be-
come members of an association, with the guilt of a criminal
conspiracy, it must be averred and proved that the actual, if
not the avowed object of the association, was criminal 4 9
Thus the case held that the mere fact of associating in a labor
organization and using the organizational strength to attain certain
employment benefits was not alone ground for indictment under
criminal conspiracy. Either the purpose or the means employed by
such organizations must be charged as illegal to come within the con-
spiracy doctrine.
The Hunt case, while it did not mark the end of such prosecutions,
did apparently represent the turning point. And one of the latest
reported cases was twenty-five years later, in 1867, when the New
Jersey Court held that a combination of workers which sought to
compel a discharge of nonunion workers constituted a criminal
conspiracy.50
But the discontinuance of criminal conspiracy prosecutions did
not mark the end of legal limitations on the right of laborers to
organize. "The conspiracy theory was scarcely laid to rest as creat-
ing a criminal offense when it was reborn as creating a civil liability
in tort."51 Justice Holmes stated the doctrine in a dissenting opinion
in Vegelahn v. Guntner:5 2
I agree, whatever may be the law in the case of a single de-
fendant, ... that when a plaintiff proves that several persons
have combined and conspired to injure his business, and have
done acts producing that effect, he shows temporal damage and
a cause of action, unless the facts disclose, or the defendants
49. 4 Metc. 111, 129 (Mass. 1842).
50. State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151 (1867).
51. Robert E. Matthews, editor, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW,
Vol. II, p. 641 (Boston, 1953, advance printing).
52. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
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prove, some ground of excuse or justification. And I take it
to be settled, and rightly settled, that doing that damage by com-
bined persuasion is actionable, as well as doing it by falsehood
or by force .... 53
Since liability in tort is almost as serious a deterrent as criminal
prosecution, the employees still had no right to associate effectively
in a union. And the wholesale use of the injunction followed the
adoption of the doctrine of civil liability.
But this was not the only disability under which the labor unions
suffered. During the latter part of the 19th century there came into
vogue the "yellow-dog" contracts under which prospective employees
agreed, as a condition of employment, not to join a union. In 1898
the Congress passed the Erdman Act,54 one provision of which out-
lawed the use of "yellow-dog" contracts by carriers in interstate com-
merce. In 1908, in Adair v. United States,s the United States
Supreme Court held this provision unconstitutional because labor
organizations "have nothing to do with interstate commerce, as
such." And in 1915, in Coppage v. Kansas,5 6 the Court held a
Kansas law which outlawed "yellow-dog" contracts invalid under
the Fourteenth Amendment as violative of the liberty of contract.
And even before these cases were decided, there was another of still
greater effect -the Danbury Hatters case.57 In that case the Court
held that concerted labor activity such as a strike or a boycott consti-
tuted a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act if it were designed
to restrict interstate commerce to a substantial degree.
In spite of these hindrances, however, laborers were making some
slow progress toward the goal of an actual right of association. The
first World War was the occasion for some of these gains. Harold
Metz states:
In January 1918 the Secretary of Labor called upon twelve
representatives of management and labor to formulate a war-
time labor policy. The resulting statement of the War Labor
Conference Board declared that workers had a right to organize
and that employers should not discriminate against them for so
doing.5 8
53. 167 Mass. 92, 105 (1896).
54. 30 STAT. 424.
55. 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
56. 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
57. Loewe v. Lawlor, 298 U. S. 274 (1908).
58. Harold Metz, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT, p. 27 (Washington, 1945).
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The Clayton Act,5 9 passed in 1914, was bailed by labor as their
Magna Carta. But it is obvious that if it had been all the laborers
thought, there would have been no necessity for the statement of
the War Labor Conference Board. The belief that the Act out-
lawed injunctions in the Federal courts in labor disputes was dis-
pelled very shortly. Section 20 of the Act stated:
That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by
any court of the United States ... in any case between employ-
ers and employees . . . growing out of a labor dispute . . .
unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or
to a property right ....
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any
person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from ter-
minating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to per-
form any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attend-
ing at any place where any such person or persons may law-
fully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicat-
ing information, or from peacefully persuading any person to
work or to abstain from working,... or from peaceably assem-
bling in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes ...
In one of the leading cases interpreting the anti-injunction clauses,
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,8 0
Chief Justice Taft declared, for the Court, that the clause was never
intended to preclude injunctions issued for the purpose of protecting
property, and that injury to business was included in injury to proper-
ty. The case arose from a reduction of wages by the Foundries. Work-
ers, members of the Central Trades Council, struck and picketed the
shop to dissuade other workers or would-be workers from entering
the shop. Violence occurred at various locations. In 1914 the
Foundries filed a bill in a United States District Court to enjoin
the Council from attempting by persuasion or violence to hinder
persons who wanted to work for the Foundries. The Court granted
a permanent injunction in the terms requested. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, except that it deleted the injunction against "per-
suasion".
In the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice placed the question square-
ly under the Clayton Act, and proceeded to interpret away any in-
59. 38 STAT. AT L. 738 (1914).
60. 257 U. S. 184 (1921).
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tent of Congress to add substantially to labor's rights in industrial
disputes. He said that in the Clayton Act:
Congress wished to forbid the use by the Federal courts of
their equity arm to prevent peaceable persuasion by employees,
. . . and to secure them against judicial restraint in obtaining
or communicating information in any place where they might
lawfully be. This introduces no new principle into the equity
jurisprudence of those courts. It is merely declaratory of what
was the best practice always.6 '
While the Court upheld the District Court in the general propriety
of the issuance of the injunction, it also upheld the Court of Appeals
in its deletion of the operation of the injunction against peaceful
persuasion. It is here that Chief Justice Taft presented the view
of the Court on the right of labor to organize in 1921:
Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when
instituted for mutual help and lawfully carrying out their le-
gitimate objects. They have long been thus recognized by the
courts .... To render this combination at all effective, employees
must make their combination extend beyond one shop .... There-
fore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their mem-
bership, and especially among those whose labor at lower wages
will injure their whole guild.62
While the courts placed the major emphasis on the economic as-
pects of association of laborers, there are other aspects of impor-
tance, also. In spite of the industrial counter-attacks in 'the first
ten or fifteen years of the twentieth century, membership in labor
organizations grew. In explanation, Foster Dulles says:
The urge to join a union, in these years as in other periods,
came not only from expectation of economic gain through collec-
tive action. The hope that he would attain greater security -
a square deal and protection from arbitrary discipline -was
always highly important, but there was also an often unconsci-
ous desire on the part of the individual wage earner to streng-
then his feeling of individual worth and significance in an in-
dustrialized society. Machinery was more and more making
the worker an automatic cog in a process over which he had no
influence or control. The complete impersonality of corporate
61. 257 U. S. 184, 203 (1921).
62. Ibid., at 209.
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business, with management far removed from any direct con-
tact with employees, further accentuated this loss of individual
status. The wage earner could find a satisfaction in membership
in such a meaningful social organization as a labor union that
was denied him as one among many thousands of depersonal-
ized employees. The desire to take part in some group activity
was, indeed, particularly strong during the progressive era. It
was a period marked by the rapid growth of social clubs, lodges,
and fraternal associations. The unions, often including some
of the ritual of the fraternal lodges, met a very real need entirely
apart from the support they provided for collective bargaining.63
The National Industrial Recovery Act 4 of 1933 was the first law
that generally guaranteed to all workers the right to organize. It
declared that workers had the right to form unions free from em-
ployer domination, interference, or coercion. And in 1935 the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act65 added broader guarantees and established
administrative means to enforce them. Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.
This would seem to settle the question of labor's right to associate
in unions, but in spite of this statute Colorado passed a Labor Peace
Act in 1943. The Act prohibited labor unions and their individual
members any right to assemble and function as unions unless incor-
porated under the laws of Colorado. In A. F. of L. v. Reilly,66
decided in the following year, a test case was brought against the
Act, the action being for a declaratory judgment. The trial court
found the Act unconstitutional. In upholding the decision of the
trial court, Justice Knous said for the Colorado Supreme Court:
The courts of the United States for many years, and general-
ly without regard to statute, have recognized the right of work-
men to organize in labor or trade unions for the purpose of
promoting their common welfare by lawful means . ...
63. Foster R. Dulles, LABOR IN AMERICA, p. 205 (New York, 1949).
64. 44 STAT. 195 (1933).
65. 49 STAT. 449 (1935).
66. 113 Colo. 90, 115 P. Zd 145, 160 A.L.R. 873 (1944).
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Notwithstanding the contrary contention of counsel for de-
fendants, we think the decisions indicate that the constitutional
guarantee of assembly to the people is not restricted to the literal
right of meeting together "to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances" ... .
While these decisions may not as unequivocally place the right
of workmen to organize and operate as a voluntary labor associa-
tion within the area of the guarantees of assembly and free
speech as the Thornhill case locates peaceful picketing within
the perimeter of the latter, their purport seems to us to support
the conclusion of the trial court that sections 20 and 21 trans-
gressed constitutionally by denying to unincorporated labor uni-
ons, and their individual members any right to assemble and func-
tion as such in the promotion of their common welfare by lawful
means . . . .67
The next step for labor, once the right of association had been
won, was to use their organized force in securing or opposing various
governmental programs. Philip Murray reported after the 1944
Presidential campaign: "Labor has long recognized that the gains
which it wins through economic action can be protected, implemented
and extended only if it develops a progressive program of legislation
and secures its enactment through effective participation in the politi-
cal life of the nation." s68 The statement was made in connection with
his approval of the continuance of the Political Action Committee of
the C.I.O. as an independent non-partisan instrument to promote
united political activity on a nationwide basis.
A question arose in 1948 as to whether unions could publish in a
union newspaper editorials or articles favoring specific candidates
in a Federal election without violating Section 304 of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act of 1947.69 The C.I.O. and its president were indicted for
violation of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as amended by the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which prohibits contribu-
tions or expenditures by corporations and labor organizations in con-
nection with Federal elections. The union president had published
an article in support of one candidate in a congressional election. The
United States District Court sustained a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Act, insofar as applied to union expenditures in
Federal elections, violated the First Amendment.
67. 155 P. 2d 145, 148-149 (1944).
68. Foster R. Dulles, LABOR IN AMERICA, p. 351 (New York, 1949).
69. 61 STAT. 136 (1947).
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The United States Supreme Court heard the case, United States
v. C.I.O.,70 on direct appeal. The Court held that since the indict-
ment did not charge an offense under the Act, there was no necessity
for ruling on its constitutionality. Justice Reed, speaking for the
Court, said: "We find in the Senate debates definite indication that
Congress did not intend to include within the coverage of the section
as an expenditure the costs of the publication described in the indict-
ment."71  Included in the opinion was an extensive examination of
the history of the legislation.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge, with whom Justices
Black, Douglas and Murphy agreed, also made an extensive ex-
amination of the history of the legislation. And he concluded that
the prohibited expenditures did include those listed in the indictment.
Therefore, he said, the constitutionality of the Act would have to be
determined. He then found the Act unconstitutional, thus reaching
the same result as the majority following Justice Reed. The impor-
tance of Justice Rutledge's statements, in the context of this general
discussion, warrants a lengthy quotation:
The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been an
integral part of our democratic and electoral processes. They
could hardly go on without it. Moreover, to an extent not neces-
sary now to attempt delimiting, that right is secured by the
guaranty of freedom of assembly, a liberty essentially coordi-
nate with the freedoms of speech, the press, and conscience ....
There is therefore an effect in restricting expenditures for the
publicizing of political views not inherently present in restrict-
ing other types of expenditure, namely, that it necessarily de-
prives the electorate, the persons entitled to hear, as well as the
author of the utterance, whether an individual or a group, of
the advantage of free and full discussion and of the right of
free assembly for that purpose.
The most complete exercise of those rights is essential to the
full, fair and untrammeled operation of the electoral process.
To the extent they are curtailed the electorate is deprived of in-
formation, knowledge and opinion vital to its function. To say
that labor unions as such have nothing of value to contribute to
that process and no vital or legitimate interest in it is to ignore
the obvious facts of political and economic life and of their in-
creasing interrelationship in modern society . . . .That ostrich-
70. 335 U. S. 106.(1948).
71. Ibid., at 116.
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like conception, if enforced by law, would deny those values both
to unions and thus to that extent to their members, as also to
the voting public in general.
72
Justice Rutledge thought that if there were evils present in union
expenditures in Federal elections, then the Act should have been
drawn narrowly to reach these evils without prohibiting all expendi-
ture of union funds in such elections. And if, as Justice Reed's
opinion stated, the Act did not prohibit all such expenditures, then
Justice Rutledge felt that the Act was still unconstitutional as being
so vague and indefinite that the labor organizations would not know
in advance what expenditures would be legal and what illegal. The
result in either case would be prior restraint on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
The acceptance by the courts and by the public generally of Jus-
tice Rutledge's philosophy shown in the above quotation would bring
to full fruition the long struggle of laborers to associate together for
mutual aid and, further, to use their association to influence the
course of political events. The former function has generally been
recognized as proper. But both the Congress and the public are in
a great part unconvinced that the latter function is properly permitted
to labor organizations operating as such.
Criminal Syndicalism and Communism
The most substantial restrictions against associations with a sub-
versive purpose are the anti-sedition laws of the national and state
governments. 73 These, however, are usually laws calling for criminal
prosecution against persons who teach or advocate overthrow of
the government by violence or who organize groups for that pur-
pose. Since such activity more properly lies in the context of exer-
cise of the right of free speech rather than freedom of assembly, it
is outside the scope of this treatment. Questions dealt with herein
are those dealing with restrictions on members of subversive groups
which operate on those persons merely because they are members,
not because of overt acts.
Section 2(3) of the Smith Act,74 passed in 1940, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to be or become a
member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assem-
bly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof ....
72. Ibid., at 143-144.
73. Walter Gellhorn, editor, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION, Ap-
pendix A Ithaca, 1952).
74. 54 STAT. 670, 671.
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The proscribed societies are those who teach, advocate, or encour-
age the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United
States by force or violence. To date there have been no prosecutions
under the Smith Act for membership only, but there is clearly a
violation where such membership is established. The Act was
modeled after the New York Criminal Anarchy Act of 1902, the
advocacy section of which was under fire in Gitlow v. New York.75
In discussing the aftermath of Federal sedition laws during World
War I, Chafee states:
After the Espionage Act showed the ease with which men
can be punished for political and economic discussion which is
distasteful to the majority of citizens, thirty-three states made
sedition in time of peace a serious crime. More than half these
states adopted an almost uniform statute, which created the new
crime of criminal syndicalism and was directed mainly against
the Industrial Workers of the World.76
The California statute made unlawful the teaching of criminal
syndicalism and, further, knowingly becoming a member of any
group organized to advocate it (without the member's necessarily
urging this doctrine himself). The leading case on this statute is
Whitney v. California, decided by the Supreme Court in 1927.77
Miss Anita Whitney was convicted under this statute of assisting
in organizing the Communist Labor Party of California, of being
a member of it, and of assembling with it. The majority felt that
association with criminal syndicalists "partakes of the nature of
criminal conspiracy," and thus the conviction was upheld. Justice
Brandeis, with whom Justice Holmes joined, concurred on the ground
that Miss Whitney had not raised the issue of "clear and present dan-
ger", but otherwise he contested the decision of the Court. He
stated :
The felony which the statute created is a crime very unlike
the old felony of conspiracy or the old misdemeanor of unlawful
assembly. The mere act of assisting in forming a society for
teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of it, or assembling
with others for that purpose is given the dynamic quality of
crime. There is guilt although the society may not contem-
75. 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
76. Chafee, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, p. 326 (Cam-
bridge, 1941).
77. 274 U. S. 357 (1927). For a full account of the case, see Chafee, op.
cit., pp. 343-354.
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plate immediate promulgation of the doctrine. Thus the ac-
cused is to be punished, not for attempt, incitement or conspiracy,
but for a step in preparation, which, if it threatens the public
order at all, does so only remotely. The novelty in the prohibi-
tion introduced is that the statute aims, not at the practice of
criminal syndicalism, nor even directly at the preaching of it,
but at association with those who propose to preach it.78
Some municipalities have passed ordinances directed at member-
ship in subversive organizations. The City of Birmingham, Alabama,
passed an ordinance in 1950 which provided a $100 fine and a maxi-
mum of 180 days in jail for each day that a known Communist re-
mained in the city. The ordinance further provided that member-
ship in the Communist Party would be presumed if a person "shall
be found in any secret or non-public place in voluntary association
or communication with any person or persons established to be or
to have been members of the Communist Party.17 9 This is guilt
by association with a vengeance.
In 1951 Massachusetts passed a statute which outlawed the Com-
munist Party by name.8 0 This was the first state law to go this far
in anti-Communist action.
There are two specific restrictions on membership in subversive
organizations which will be discussed here: restrictions on partici-
pation in the electoral process, and restrictions on public employment.
There are other aspects of regulation which provide additional disabil-
ities for membership in subversive organizations, but their scope and
complexity preclude inclusion in this discussion. Some of these
are: denial of access to the National Labor Relations Board to those
unions whose officers do not sign a non-Communist affidavit ;81 denial
of entry into the United States to aliens who are or were affiliated
with groups classified as subversive;82 deportation of aliens who
are or were affiliated with such groups ;83 registration requirements
78. 274 U. S. 357, 372-373 (1927).
79. The New York Times, July 19, 1950.
80. Ann. L. of Mass. 1951 Supp., Ch. 264, § 16 et seq.
81. See American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382
(1950).
82. See the McCarran Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT.
163. On the power of exclusion of aliens from the United States see Head
Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651
(1892).
83. See the Nationalities Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 673; United States ex rel.
Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950); Vergas v. Shaugh-
nessy, 97 F. Supp. 335 (.. D. N. Y., 1951); Earisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U. S. 580 (1952).
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under state laws and the McCarran Internal Security Act 84 for
groups classified as subversive;85 and restrictions on the right to
engage in certain private occupations, such as the practice of law.86
Restrictions on access to the electoral process mainly consist of
(1) exclusion of a party from the ballot, and (2) an oath require-
ment of candidates for public office that they do not believe in over-
throw of the government by violence and that they are not affiliated
with any organization which does so.
According to Gellhorn, there are fifteen states and territories
which have laws falling in the first category.8 7 The leading case on
the constitutionality of such a prohibition is Communist Party v.
Peek.88 There were three major provisions of the California law
which were involved in that case. One provided that no party "shall
be recognized or qualified to participate in any primary election which
uses or adopts as any part of its party designation the word 'com-
munist' or any derivative of the word 'communist'." The California
Supreme Court held this provision invalid as having no reasonable
relation to the objective of eliminating subversive parties from the
election process:
The name adopted by a political party is frequently without
any value in ascertaining the political beliefs of its adherents,
and if the beliefs were pernicious, they would remain so despite
a change in the name of the party.89
Another section of the law imposed the same prohibition against
any party "which is directly or indirectly affiliated, by any means
whatsoever, with the Communist Party of the United States, the
Third Communist International, or any other foreign agency, politi-
cal party, organization or government." On this provision the opinion
stated:
It is special legislation and it attempts to bar political beliefs
merely by reference to the particular name borne by groups at
84. Public Law 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.
85. See William B. Prendergast, "State Legislatures and Communists: the
Current Scene," 44 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 556 (1950); Walter Gellhorn, ed.,
THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (Ithaca, 1952).
86. See American Bar Association resolutions in 37 A.B.A.J. 312-313 (1951).
For other cases and notes on these undiscussed points, see Thomas I. Emerson
and David Haber, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, c. IV (Buffalo, 1952).
87. Walter Gellhorn, editor, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION, Ap-
pendix A (Ithaca, 1952).
88. 20 Cal. 2d 536, 127 P. 2d 889 (1942).
89. 127 P. 2d 889, 895 (1942).
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present thought to advocate objectionable doctrines. Such legis-
lation has no rational basis. The change of a party name would
satisfy the statute without altering the political doctrines at which
the Legislature has aimed its restrictions .... Such a prohibition
would destroy the rights of suffrage of those members of any
party which affiliated itself with a foreign organization however
beneficial the purposes of such an organization or however far
removed from the field of political action within this country.90
A third provision prohibited participation by any party "which
either directly or indirectly carries on, advocates, teaches, justifies,
aids, or abets a program of sabotage, force and violence, sedition or
treason against, the Government of the United States or this State."
This provision the Court held constitutional.
Such groups constitute an immediate threat to the functioning
of our institutions, including the continued exercise of the right
of suffrage. Since it is within the power of the state as to
such groups to restrict even the rights of free speech and free
press (. . . Whitney v. California . . .), it dearly was within
the reasonable bounds of the Legislature's power to determine
that these bodies should also be barred from the primary elec-
tion ballot.91
The statute, however, provided that the Secretary of State of Cali-
fornia should have authority to determine which parties came within
the prohibition of this latter section. The Court held that such power
in the hands of an administrative official was too liable of abuse. And
the possible interference with so important a right as that of suffrage
required opportunity for notice, hearing and judicial review.
An Arkansas statute similar to the third section of the California
law was held constitutional in 1940 in Field v. Hall.92 The Act was
entitled "An Act to Bar Un-American Parties from the Election
Ballot." Section 1 of the Act provided that:
No political party shall be recognized and given a place on
the ballot which advocates the overthrow by force or violence
... of our local, State or national government ....
In addition it provided that no new party could be placed on the
ballot until its officers had filed an affidavit stating that the party
does not advocate overthrow of the government by violence and that
90. Ibid., at 897-898.
91. Ibid., at 898.
92. 201 Ark. 77, 143 S. W. 2d 567 (1940).
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it is not affiliated with any group which does. The Secretary of State
was given the power to determine whether an applicant party came
within the statutory prohibition. The Arkansas Supreme Court held
that Act constitutional. The Court felt that the remedy of mandamus
was a sufficient safeguard for parties alleging unjust denial on the
part of the Secretary of State. In a very brief opinion, it was stated
that "We think the act is constitutional because it in no way abridges
the civil right of suffrage and the right to the freedom of speech."
The Court thought also that the legislatures of the various states
"have authority to establish conditions precedent to the existence and
operation of political parties."
The more recent type of restriction on access to the electoral pro-
cess is the requirement that candidates for public office take an oath
that they do not believe in overthrow of the government by violence.
Gellhorn lists ten states which have such laws. 93 The Maryland
Ober Act9 4 provides that no person can become a candidate for public
office unless he files an affidavit that he is not a "subversive person."
Such a person is defined as any person who commits, attempts to
commit, or teaches any person to commit, any act intended to over-
throw the government by force or violence, or who is a member of an
organization engaged in such conduct. In Shub v. Simpson,95 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held the Act invalid as applied to candi-
dates for Federal office, but valid for candidates for state office. The
United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of
the constitutionality of this interpretation of the Ober Act in Gerende
v. Board of Supervisors.96 Gerende was denied a place on the ballot
for failure to file the affidavit. In a per curiam opinion the Court
said:
The scope of the state law was passed on in Shub v. Simpson
.... We read this decision to hold that to obtain a place on a
Maryland ballot a candidate need only make oath that he is not
a person who is engaged "in one way or another in the attempt
to overthrow the government by force or violence," and that he is
not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an
attempt .... At the bar of this Court the Attorney General of the
State of Maryland declared that he would advise the proper au-
thorities to accept an affidavit in these terms as satisfying in full
93. Walter Gellhorn, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION, Appendix A
(Ithaca, 1952).
94. Md. Laws 1949, c. 86, § 15.
95. 76 A. 2d 332 (Md. 1950).
96. 341 U. S. 56 (1951).
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the statutory requirement. Under these circumstances and with
this understanding, the judgment of the Maryland Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
The State of Alabama went further and adopted a requirement
that applicants for registration as voters must take a loyalty oath.
In 1951 the proposed constitutional amendment passed the legisla-
ture,97 and was adopted by the voters. It provided that applicants
for registration take an oath disavowing belief in or affiliation at any
time with any group or party which advocates overthrow of the
government by unlawful means. Alabama is one of the few states
in which advisory opinions may be obtained by the legislature from
the state supreme court. In 1949, in such an advisory opinion on
the proposed bill, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:
. . . One who advocates the overthrow of the government
by unlawful means cannot be held to embrace the duties and
obligations of citizenship under the Constitution which provides
for changes in governmental regulation by lawful means. The
requirements do not seek to force one to believe in all the
theories of our government, but his advocacy of changes must
be by lawful means .... His oath required by the Amendment
would not be conclusive that he embraces the duties and obli-
gations of citizenship under the Constitution, but would be prima
fade evidence of it. Of course inquiry would be open to the
board of registrars to hear evidence which may conflict with
that status.98
Presumably petition for mandamus would be the only method of
getting a judicial hearing on the question of arbitrary exercise of
authority by the registrar after the "inquiry" mentioned by the Court.
While restrictions on access to the electoral process against per-
sons presently and actually teaching overthrow of the government
by violence would appear to be constitutional, there is a question as
to the wisdom of such policies. Americans are a resilient people,
and so far such doctrines have not proved particularly viable in
this country. The dangers of specific acts of espionage or sabo-
tage are real and they are present. But they can be minimized
by application of laws already present on the statute books without
adding new laws which contain the greater possibility for damage
to innocent people than for remedying the evils of subversion. The
97. Acts oF ArABAMA 1950-51, No. 426.
98. 252 Ala. 351, 49 So. 2d 849, 855 (1949).
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literal application of the Alabama provision would, for example, de-
prive a person of the franchise if he had belonged to the Communist
party for six months in 1930 or 1920 or even farther back, no matter
what his more recent sentiments. The depression of the 30's caused
many Americans to affiliate with the more radical organizations in their
desperate groping for solutions to our economic problems. And even
if the applicant for registration has never been affiliated with the
proscribed organizations, a doubt sowed in the mind of the registrar
by some personal enemy would be the occasion for an inquiry. With
the present state of associational jitters in the United States, the
inquiry itself in the minds of many people brands the suspect as guilty
even when given a clean bill of health.
Aside from the possible damage to innocent people, it is doubtful
whether in a democratic country any group should be denied the ballot
merely for what they believe. People who are denied the ballot are
forced to use violence to gain their ends in government. And we
cannot use the traditional justification for outlawing violent over-
throw of the government - the available alternative of peaceful
change through democratic processes. If groups are actively advo-
cating overthrow of the government by violence, then they can be
prosecuted under the sedition laws, and conviction will mean the loss
of the franchise automatically.99
Another application of the loyalty oath is to prospective govern-
ment employees. The leading case here is Garner v. Board of Public
Works.10 0 In 1941 the California legislature amended the Charter
of the City of Los Angeles to prohibit employment by the City of
any person who had, within five years prior to the Act, either taught
overthrow of the government by violence or been a member of any
organization which taught or advocated such action. In 1948, Los
Angeles adopted legislation to effectuate its terms. The Los Angeles
ordinance required the filing of an oath by all employees that they
had not engaged in the prescribed activity, and an affidavit "stating
whether or not he is or ever was a member of the Communist Party
of the United States of America or of the Communist Political Asso-
ciation, and if he is or was such a member, stating the dates when
he became, and the periods during which he was, such a member."
Some of the petitioners took the oath but refused to execute the
affidavit. The rest refused to do both. All were discharged. In
contesting the dismissals petitioners contended that the ordinance
99. On access to electoral process see Note, 3 VAND. L. REV. 811 (1950).
100. 341 U. S. 716 (1951).
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was a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, and violated their free-
dom of speech and assembly. The California District Court of Ap-
peal denied relief, 10 1 and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
While the contention was that the oath and affidavit must stand
or fall together, the majority of the Court did not agree. As to the
affidavit, the opinion stated:
We think that a municipal employer is not disabled because
it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as
to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability
for the public service. Past conduct may well relate to present
fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to pre-
sent and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in de-
termining fitness for both high and low positions in private
industry, and are not less relevant in public employment. The
affidavit requirement is valid. 102
With respect to the oath, the Court had more difficulty. While
seven of the justices held the affidavit valid, only five thought the
oath constitutional. Thus five held both valid, two held the affida-
vit valid but not the oath, and two held both invalid. The majority
of five held that the oath was not ex post facto since the period of
prohibited membership was 1943-1948, and the California statute
was passed in 1941, thus giving advance warning of the qualification
to be imposed. The majority took the view also that the oath re-
quirement was merely a qualification for employment, and not a
punishment within the meaning of a bill of attainder. The conten-
tion that the requirement was bad because an employee might have
joined one of the proscribed organizations innocently was not ac-
cepted by the majority, because, they felt, it was to be assumed
that only knowingly becoming affiliated with one of the organizations
covered by the oath was the disqualifying membership.
Justices Frankfurter and Burton held the affidavit requirement
valid but thought the oath requirement invalid. justice Frankfurter's
comments are particularly appropriate to the discussion of the right
of association:
The vice in this oath is that it is not limited to affiliation with
organizations known at the time to have advocated overthrow
of the government .... If this ordinance is sustained, sanction
101. 98 Cal. App. 2d 493, 220 P. 2d 958 (1950).
102. 341 U. S. 716, 720 (1951).
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is given to like oaths for every governmental unit in the United
States. Not only does the oath make an irrational demand.
It is bound to operate as a real deterrent to people contemplat-
ing even innocent associations. How can anyone be sure that
an organization with which he affiliates will not at some time
in the future be found by a State or National official to advocate
overthrow of government by "unlawful means"? All but the
hardiest may well hesitate to join organizations if they know
that by such a proscription they will be permanently disqualified
from public employment. These are considerations that cut deep
into the traditions of our people. Gregariousness and friendli-
ness are among the most characteristic of American attitudes
The needs of security do not require such curbs on what may
well be innocuous feelings and associations. Such curbs are
indeed self-defeating. They are not merely unjustifiable re-
straints on individuals. They are not merely productive of an
atmosphere of repression uncongenial to the spiritual vitality of-
a democratic society. The inhibitions 'which they engender are
hostile to the best conditions for securing a high-minded and
high-spirited public service.103
Justice Burton reached the same result as did Justice Frankfurter.
Justices Douglas and Black thought the facts brought the case square-
ly under the rules of the Cummings and Garland cases 04 which held
certain test oaths invalid as being bills of attainder and ex post facto.
In 1952 the Court rendered a decision in another public employ-
ment case, Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York.105
It was not a problem of the loyalty oath, but it did involve the ques-
tion of public employment for subversives. The Feinberg Law,
passed in 1949, provided that after an inquiry and some sort of notice
and hearing the Board of Regents should prepare a list of subver-
sive organizations. Then membership in any of these organizations
should constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification for em-
ployment in the public schools. Both the listed organizations and
any person in danger of being fired were to have a hearing and the
right of judicial review. The action was for a declaratory judgment
103. 341 U. S. 716, 726-728 (1951). On the dangers of indiscriminate join-
ing, see "If in Doubt Don't Join," UNITED STATES NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, September 22, 1950, pp. 20-21.
104. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall, 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall,
333 (1867).
105. 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
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to have the law declared unconstitutional. The Court heard the
case on appeal from a decision hy the New York Court of Appeals
holding the law valid.
The majority of six justices upheld the Feinberg Law. Justice
Minton, speaking for the majority, stated that persons have no right
to work for the State in the school system on their own terms. If
they do not choose to work for the school system upon the reason-
able terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York, "they
are at libesty to retain their beliefs and associations and go else-
where." This may very well be true, but the question then hinges
on what is a "reasonable term." He places the regulation in a cate-
gory and then proceeds in his opinion to argue whether the category
is justified. In justification for calling the regulation reasonable he
states:
That the school authorities have the right and the duty to
screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness
to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered
society, cannot he doubted. One's associates, past and present,
as well as one's conduct, may properly bie considered in determin-
ing fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial, one's reputation
has been determined in part by the company he keeps. In the
employment of officials and teachers of the school system, the
state may very properly inquire into the company they keep,
and we know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that pre-
vents the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty of such
persons, from considering the organizations and persons with
whom they associate. 10 6
The majority held that the case came within the Garner rule, and,
as the quoted section indicates, gave official acceptance to the doctrine
of guilt by association. Two aspects of the law and its application
were held to remove any doubt of its constitutionality. First, the
law, as construed by the New York court, required that the member
of the organization must have known about its purpose. Second,
there is the opportunity for a review of dismissal or denial of em-
ployment at which time the injured person can offer evidence to
overcome the presumption of knowledge attached to membership.
'Justice Douglas wrote a ringing dissent. His statement is better
directed to the wisdom of the law than its constitutionality, but the
latter question is covered nonetheless. He stated:
106. 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952).
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I have not been able to accept the recent doctrine that a citi-
zen who enters the public service can be forced to sacrifice his civil
rights. I cannot for example find in our constitutional scheme
the power of a state to place its employees in the category of
second-class citizens by denying them freedom of thought and
expression. The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought
and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to
it; and none needs it more than the teacher ....
The present law proceeds on a principle repugnant to our
society- guilt by association. A teacher is disqualified because
of her membership in an organization found to be "subversive"
.... The irrebuttable charge that the organization is "subver-
sive" therefore hangs as an ominous cloud over her own hearing.
The mere fact of membership in the organization raises a prima
facie case of her own guilt. She may, it is said, show her inno-
cence. But innocence in this case turns on knowledge; and
when the witch hunt is on, one who must rely on ignorance leans
on a feeble reed ....
Of course the school systems of the country need not become
cells for Communist activities; and the classrooms need not
become forums for propagandizing the Marxist creed. But the
guilt of the teacher should turn on overt acts. So long as she
is a law-abiding citizen, so long as her performance within the
public school system meets professional standards, her private
life, her political philosophy, her social creed should not be the
cause of reprisals against her.10 7
In the same year, but in the next term of court, the Supreme Court
had before it another loyalty oath, this time an Oklahoma require-
ment, in Wientan v. Updegraff.0 8 But the provisions of the Okla-
homa oath not even the more calloused members of the Court could
stomach. The decision was unanimous in favor of holding the re-
quirement invalid, with Justice Jackson taking no part in the case.
The law, passed in 1950, required each state officer and employee,
as a condition of his employment, to take a loyalty oath, stating,
among other things, that he was not and had not been for the pre-
ceding five years a member of any organization listed by the Attorney
General of the United States as "communist front" or "subversive."
As construed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, it excluded per-
sons from state employment solely on the basis of membership in
107. 342 U. S. 485, 508, 509, 511 (1952).
108. 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
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such organizations, regardless of their knowledge concerning the
activities and purposes of the organizations to which they bad be-
longed. Appellants, members of the faculty and staff of the Okla-
homa Agricultural and Mechanical College, failed to take the oath.
Updegraff brought a taxpayer's suit to enjoin payment of further
compensation to all who failed to take the oath. Over the conten-
tions of appellants that the requirement was a bill of attainder, ex
post facto, and violative of due process, the Oklahoma trial court
upheld the law, and the state supreme court upheld this decision.10 9
Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court holding the oath
requirement invalid. He noted that under the statute before the
Court the fact of membership alone disqualified the state officer or
employee. In objection to this he, said:
But membership may be innocent. A state servant may have
joined a proscribed organization unaware of its activities and
purposes. In recent years, many completely loyal persons have
severed organizational ties after learning for the first time of the
character of groups to which they had belonged . . . . At the
time of affiliation, a group itself may be innocent, only later
coming under the influence of those who would turn it toward
illegitimate ends. Conversely, an organization formerly sub-
versive and therefore designated as such may have subsequent-
ly freed itself from the influences which originally led to its
listing.11 0
He distinguished the Garner and Adler cases on the ground that
in those cases the disqualifying requirement was membership in the
proscribed organizations and knowing their purposes. Apparently
Justice Clark was anxious to modify the guilt by association doctrine
accepted by the majority in the Adler case. He backpedaled on this
point by saying:
... (U)nder the Oklahoma Act, the fact of association alone
determines disloyalty and disqualification; it matters not whether
association existed innocently or knowingly. To thus inhibit
individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of demo-
cratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources.
We hold that the distinction observed between the case at bar
and Garner, Adler and Gerende is decisive. Indiscriminate
109. Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951).
110. 344 U. S. 183, 190 (1952).
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classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process.'11
He also made a strategic withdrawal in the matter of giving the
State free rein to establish qualifications for employment. He said
that to draw from the language of the earlier cases "the facile
generalization that there is no constitutionally protected right to
public employment is to obscure the issue." He further stated, "We
need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public em-
ployment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
Justice Black concurred in the result, but on much broader grounds.
He is opposed to test oaths per se. He stated:
'rest oaths are notorious tools of tyranny. When used to
shackle the mind they are, or at least they should be, unspeakably
odious to a free people ....
Governments need and have ample power to punish treason-
able acts. But it does not follow that they must have a further
power to punish thought and speech as distinguished from acts.
Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigma-
tize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a
way of reaching, ensnaring, and silencing many more people
than at first intended. We must have freedom of speech for
all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing
and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the
right to speak on matters of public concern must be wholly free
or eventually be wholly lost."i2
The state certainly has a right to prohibit the advocacy, whether
in the public schools or out, of overthrow of the government by vio-
lence when there is danger of action ensuing from such advocacy. The
difficulty with test oaths, registrations, and other peripheral pro-
hibitions or restrictions against subversives, however, is that the effec-
tiveness of such restrictions in stamping out subversion is probably
very small, and the possibilities for damage to innocent persons are
very large. At the very least Americans will become, indeed they
have become, so cautious about joining associations that only those
ultra-acceptable ones can recruit new members. And the contribu-
111. 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952).
112. 344 U. S. 183, 193 (1952).
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tions to a democratic society which arise from free association will
be severely reduced if not lost.
Ku KLTx KIAN
Conceived in the bitterness and prejudice of the Reconstruction
period, the [Cu Klux M(Ian has followed a cyclical pattern of persecu-
tion and dormancy. In periods of national stress the Klan stirs it-
self to safeguard the American way of life through floggings, threats
and worse. While the avowed purposes of the organization are legal
and perhaps legitimate, the methods employed are on many occasions
illegal. Thus it is not a subversive organization in the sense that
it advocates overthrow of the government by violence. It does, how-
ever, offer its services as a substitute for due process of law when
it feels the occasion demands. There are several problems of effec-
tive punishment of those members who act illegally. First, the local
law enforcement officers themselves are sometimes members or even
officers of the Klan. In these cases, certainly, no punishment could
be expected. Second, the victims of Klan attacks are often not the
most desirable type of citizen, and public opinion does not become
sufficiently aroused when the community itself disapproves of the
victim. Third, the Klan members customarily have donned the white
robes and hoods of their order prior to their soul-purging activities.
Identification of the participants is then either difficult or impossible.
And even when the victim might be able to identify the participants,
fear of reprisals operates to dim his memory.
Since the avowed purposes of the organization are not illegal, the
Klan as an organization has not been specifically outlawed. Member-
ship in the Klan is not illegal, but several states have enacted laws de-
signed to eliminate the danger of illegal activities of its members as
Klansmen. The most common provision of this type is the anti-
masking law. Gellhorn lists twelve states which as of January, 1951,
had such laws. 1 3 Since that time Alabama and South Carolina have
been added, and as of this writing a bill of this type is being con-
sidered by the legislature of North Carolina. The South Carolina
Act,1 14 passed in 1951, is interesting in that it not only prohibits
masks and disguises, but also flaming crosses -another of the Klan
trade-marks. Section 1 of the Act provides:
No person over sixteen years of age shall appear or enter
113. Walter Gelhorn, editor, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION, Ap-
pendix A (Ithaca, 1952).
114. Acts oV' SOUTH CAROLINA, 1951, No. 99.
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upon any lane, walk, alley, street, road, public way, or highway
of this State or upon the public property of the State or of
any municipality or county in this State while wearing a mask
or other device which conceals his identity; nor shall any such
person demand entrance or admission to, or enter upon the pre-
mises or into the enclosure or house of any other person while
wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity; nor shall
any such person, while wearing a mask or device which conceals
his identity, participate in any meeting or demonstration upon
the private property of another unless he shall have first obtained
the written permission of the owner and the occupant of such
property.
Section 3 of the Act prohibits the placing of a burning cross,
real or simulated, in a public place, and section 4 prohibits the plac-
ing of such crosses on any private property without the written per-
mission of the owner or occupier of the premises. To date no re-
ported cases deal with the validity of these laws, but it can safely
be presumed that they meet the test of constitutionality, at least
under the Federal Constitution.
Another type of regulation directed toward the Klan is the regis-
tration requirement. Such a requirement was before the United
States Supreme Court in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmernman.115
The New York law, passed in 1923, provided that every oath-bound
society with a membership of twenty or more persons should file
with the Secretary of State a sworn copy of its constitution, rules
and oath of membership, together with a list of officers and members.
Labor unions and benevolent societies were excluded from the terms
of the act. Membership in an organization included in the statute
which had failed to comply with its terms was made a misdemeanor.
Bryant was convicted under the act, and the main question before
the Court in reviewing the conviction was whether the terms of the
act violated equal protection of the laws, in that unions and other
orders were not covered.
justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the Court holding
the act valid. He stated:
The courts below . . . reached the conclusion that the classi-
fication was justified by a difference between the two classes of
associations shown by experience, and that the difference con-
sisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make
115. 278 U. S. 63 (1928).
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the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak
for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public wel-
fare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of
the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts
.. said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the
included Class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this
organization functions largely at night, its members disguised
by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror
into the minds of the people," and later said of the other class:
"These organizations and their purposes are well known, many
of them having been in existence for many years. Many of
them are oathbound and secret. But we hear of no complaints
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with
the rights of others."
116
The Court then went into the evidence of the activities of the
Klan. The opinion noted that membership was limited to native-
born, gentile, protestant whites; that the organization espoused white
supremacy and stimulated racial and religious prejudices; and that
at times it was "taking into its own hands the punishment of what
some of its members conceived to be crimes." On the basis of the
evidence available, the opinion stated that, "We think it plain that
the action of the courts below in holding that there was a real and
substantial basis for the distinction made between the two sets of
associations or orders was right and should not be disturbed."
These are examples of laws which indirectly get at the illegal ac-
tivities of a particular type of association. They do not penalize
membership, but if enforced, they make it more hazardous for the
members to engage in illegal activities. This is the key difference
between the desirable and the undesirable types of regulation. The
former penalizes illegal activities, while the latter penalizes asso-
ciation itself.
To summarize the discussion of the right of association, then, one
may say first that there is no specific statement of such a right in
either the national Constitution or in any of the state constitutions.
It is, however, a right cognate to those of free speech and free assem-
bly. Associations have a place of particular importance in a democ-
racy, whether they are associations of laborers, professional men, or
electors and office-seekers. They serve as a training ground for group
participation, organization and management of people and programs,
116. 278 U. S. 63, 75 (1928).
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and for democratic acceptance of the majority will. They can also
serve as a potential influence for improvement of communication
between the individual and the government. Concerted demands for
action by associations of people have a better chance for accomplish-
ing the desired governmental action than do scattered individual re-
quests. And the information furnished to administrators and legis-
lators by private associations of various kinds is in many instances
vital to the intelligent treatment of particular problems.
Some associations or interest groups go further than merely at-
tempting to influence governmental policy and organize themselves
into parties to capture offices and to determine policy. Many of our
minor parties began as such interest groups. Even without these,
however, there are the two major parties. And political parties are
our most important associations. The right to organize parties and
to nominate candidates is a matter of law. The major parties, and
others which have strong followings, have not met any particular
difficulties under the laws in nominating candidates and having such
candidates entered on ballots. There are substantial requirements for
numerical strength, however, which serve to discourage the smaller
minor parties. The state provisions for the number of signers on
petitions requesting a place on the ballots might profitably be amended
to require less numerical strength. Certainly the expense involved
in according a ballot position to every group of a dozen persons who
call themselves a political party would be prohibitive. But minor
parties should not be faced with insurmountable obstacles to exis-
tence. The importance of associations in a democratic society does
not argue for complete absence of restrictions. Where the associa-
tion engages in unlawful activities or is organized for an unlawful
purpose, then it has no proper place in our society. The question,
of course, is what activities or purposes are properly classed as un-
lawful? The history of labor organizations shows the development
of an association from the status of a criminal conspiracy to that of
an organization afforded positive recognition and protection under
the law. And the Communist Party has undergone a reverse de-
velopment, so that now, while the Party itself is not technically out-
lawed (except in some states), advocacy of its doctrines is illegal,
membership in it is subject to various disabilities, and the Party has
been denied a place on the ballot in many states.
Some associations, such as Murder Incorporated, are illegal in
purpose and action, and are clearly entitled to no constitutional
guarantee of existence. Others, such as the Ku Klux Klan, are
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legal in their avowed purposes but often engage in illegal activities.
Regulatory measures here have followed a logical pattern of getting
at the illegal practices without outlawing the Klan, thus attempting to
cure the disease without destroying the patient. Unhappily, this
has not been true with respect to the so-called subversive organiza-
tions. The anti-subversive regulations have gone so far as to re-
quire in some cities deportation for any person who is seen talking
to other persons in a non-public place who are at present or in the
past have been Communists. This is the sort of shotgun legislation
which endangers the whole institution of voluntary association. The
Communist threat is a real-and present danger, and it cannot be ig-
nored. But neither can Americans afford to destroy the whole demo-
cratic society in order to root out one evil. The contributions made
by exercise of the broad freedom to associate are too important to
the proper operation of a democratic system to be seriously impaired
by hasty, ill-considered measures.
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